Chen Enxian

Faculty

Full Time Faculty

Enxian Chen

Job Title:Assistant Professor

Research Areas:
Economic theory and applications, including game theory,
Cmathematical economics, transportation games.

EMAIL:eccex@nankai.edu.cn

Research Areas

Microeconomics, Game Theory, Mathematical Finance, Mathematical Economics, Statistics and Econo- metrics.

Education

Ph.D. Mathematical Economics, National University of Singapore, Jul. 2016 - Feb. 2021.

B.S. Mathematics with Honors degree, Zhejiang University, Aug. 2012 - Jul. 2016.Honors degree

Exchange student, Australian National University, Jul. 2014 - Dec. 2014.

Professional Experiences

Assistant Professor, School of Economics, Nankai University, Sep. 2021 - present.

Prizes and Awards

The President Graduate Fellowship, National University of Singapore, 2016 - 2020. 

The First Prize Scholarship, Zhejiang University, 2014.

First Class Scholarship for Elite Students in Basic Sciences, Zhejiang University, 2013, 2014, 2015.

Academic Publications

Working Papers
            
Robust perfect equilibrium in large games (revise and resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory) 

with Lei Qiao, Xiang Sun, and Yeneng Sun

Abstract: This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is    shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and satisfy the important proper-    ties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen    relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number    of agents.  Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented.  In the    particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a    unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.
                        
Does randomization matter in dynamic games?

with Wei He, Yeneng Sun and Hanping Xu

Abstract:  This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information.  We present an example to demonstrate that players may obtain higher payoffs by playing mixed strategies. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows the no-mixing property for two-player dynamic zero- sum games, implying that mixed strategy is unnecessary in this classical and widely adopted class of games.  As for applications, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in two-player zero-sum games with nature.  Based on the main result, we also prove the existence of a universal subgame-perfect equilibrium that can induce all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in such games.  A generalization of the main result for multiple players and some further results are also discussed.

Equilibrium reﬁnements in large games: a revisit 

with Xiang Sun

Abstract: In this paper, we reformulate the notions of perfect and proper equilibria in the framework of large games with ﬁnite or countable action spaces. We show the existence of pure strategy perfect and proper equilibria in these two cases.  For large games with general action spaces, we obtain two necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of pure strategy perfect and proper equilibria.
                        
A unifying closed graph property for equilibria in large games

with Bin Wu and Hanping Xu

Abstract:  This paper shows that large game is an appropriate idealization for games with large but ﬁnitely many players.  In particular, if for any sequence of large ﬁnite games converging to the large game and any sequence of randomized strategy Nash equilibria corresponding to the large ﬁnite game, the weak limit of the sequence of randomized strategy Nash equilibria must be induced by a randomized strategy Nash equilibrium of the large game. This result implies some existing results in the earlier literature.