Ding Sihua

Faculty

Full Time Faculty

DING Sihua

Institute of Economics

Job Title:Associate Professor

Research Areas:
Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Networks, Industrial Organization

EMAIL:sihuading@outlook.com

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Cambridge  2015-2019
  Field: Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Networks, Industrial Organization
  Thsis Title: Networks, Clubs and Matching
Visiting PhD Student, Stanford University   April 2018
Econometric Society Summer School in Seoul  August 2017
MPhil in Economic Research (distinction), University of Cambridge  2014-2015
BSc in Mathematical Economics and Statistics (first class), University of Birmingham  2012-2014
BSc in Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China  2010-2014

Professional Experiences

Referee: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Eco- nomic Behaviour

Academic Publications

“Unequal Networks: A Theory Based on Link Investment Substitutability”
Abstract: This paper provides a perspective to explain different properties of networks with different link formation requirements. We propose a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) link formation specifi- cation that generalises commonly used link formation assumptions in the existing literature. The CES specification also enables the investigation of how the substitutability of link investments determines network structures. We apply our novel link formation specification to two well-known network forma- tion models and illustrate that link investment substitutability is closely tied to the emergence of various network properties, among which is the unequalness of networks, which has great social and economic implications.

“Connecting Friends”
Abstract: Network formation literature typically assumes that the creation and severing of a relationship is a decision made by the two ends of it. This paper enriches the range of investigation by analyzing a model where links can be formed via introductions from mutual friends. I assume that players who are hetero- geneous in their attractiveness undergo a matching process where the set of feasible matches is defined by a network. I investigate how the incentive for making an introduction, when players’ objective is to enhance own matching outcome, depends on the endowment configuration and network positions. The characterization revolves around the structure of alternating path with a descending endowment pattern. I also examine the stability of networks based on introductions and welfare implications of such activities.

“A Simple Model of the Power Elite”
Abstract: A number of empirical studies argue that, in modern democratic societies, decision making power is concentrated in a very small group of individuals. The sociologist, C. Wright Mills, referred to this group as the ‘Power Elite’. Opinion is divided on the impact of such concentration. On the one hand, there is the view that such cohesion facilitates the spread of information, best practices and of cooperative behaviour. On the other hand, others have argued that such personal connections sustain favouritism and perpetuate inequality. What are the determinants of exclusive structures and the emergence of dominant groups? Are such structures socially desirable? We propose a model of club membership to explore these questions. The model has two types of active agents: individuals seeking to join clubs and club owners. We study efficient and stable club memberships. Our main result is that, when membership availability exceeds club capacity, both efficiency and stability dictate that a subset of individuals fully exhaust their club membership capacity while all others are entirely excluded from all membership.

Conference and Seminar Presentations

2021	6th Annual Conference in Network Science and Economics, PKU, 9th China Game Theory Inter- national Conference
2020	Nankai
2019	Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2019 Conference (Ischia), Cambridge
2018	EDGE Jamboree Workshop (Munich), 4th Annual Conference in Network Science and Economics (Nashville), 23rd Coalition Theory Network Workshop (Maastricht), Stanford, Cambridge
2017	22nd Coalition Theory Network Workshop (Glasgow), Cambridge
2016	Cambridge